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Abstract 
 This article contributes to the research agenda of accommodating psychological insights in 
conventional lab experiments. We specifically test whether inducing subjects into different mood 
states has a significant effect on subjects rationality (in the form of preference reversals) and on 
bidding behavior in homegrown value auctions. We find that mood states can significantly affect the 
rate of preference reversal and bidding behavior in experimental auction valuation. Specifically we 
find that subjects exhibit more rational behavior under a positive mood state than under a negative 
mood state.  Subjects in a positive mood provide lower bid values than others.  Regardless of mood 
states, males tend to commit a higher rate of preference reversal than females in mixed gender 
sessions. However, females tend to commit higher rate of preference reversal in female only sessions 
than in mixed sessions while males tend to commit a lower rate of preference reversal when in male 
only sessions than in mixed sessions. 
Keywords: mood, affect, rationality, Vickrey auction, preference reversals, gender differences 
JEL codes: C91 
 
Introduction  
 The “Paretian Turn” that took place in the early 20th century, initiated by Pareto, stripped 
economics of all psychological concepts by basing economic theory on the principles of rational 
choice (see Bruni and Sugden 2007 for a historical perspective). However, with the advent of 
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“behavioral economics”, economics and psychology no longer stand in complete isolation.  In fact, a 
synthesis of the potential fruitfulness of interacting economics with psychological concepts has 
appeared in core economic journals (1998; Elster 1998; Rabin 2002). For example, Elster (1998) 
brought out the interesting features of “emotions” that could be useful in developing economic 
theory and in explaining human behavior. Elster’s work has been extremely influential as evident by 
the increased number of published articles following his work. His article has also been cited by a 
number of economists who studied the effect of emotions on economic behavior. For example, 
Bosman et al. (2005) and Reuben and van Winden (2008) explored the effect of emotions such as 
anger, irritation, envy, happiness, joy etc. in a “power-to-take” experiment (Bosman and van Winden 
2002) while Grund and Sliwka (2005) examined the effect of envy and compassion in a tournament 
competition. Karni et al. (2008) tested for the presence of concern for fairness in individual choice 
behavior in a three person dictator game. 
 Although a number of economic studies have focused on studying the effect of emotions in 
recent years, there is scant literature on the examination of the closely related concept of mood in 
economics. The literature in economics usually confounds emotions and mood in an almost 
indistinguishable way. However, there are stark differences between emotions and moods, as 
described in the psychology literature. Emotions tend to be extremely brief, lasting for a few seconds 
(Izard 1991; Larsen 2000) while moods typically last longer (Watson and Vaidya 2003). Prolonged 
emotional states are possible but they only tend to be dysfunctional manifestations of 
psychopathology (Clark and Watson 1994). Watson and Vaidya (2003) provide an example of how 
the full emotion of anger might last for only a few seconds while an annoyed or irritable mood may 
persist for several hours or even for a few days. In essence, the concept of mood subsumes all 
subjective feeling states, not simply those experiences that accompany classical, prototypical 
emotions such as fear and anger (Watson and Vaidya 2003). Therefore, to explore all aspects of 
affective states on human behavior, it would be necessary to go beyond the narrow boundaries of 
emotions by examining the much broader concept of mood. 
Moods states could influence behavior by influencing both the content and the process of 
cognition (Capra 2004). Moods can also play an important role in the construction of preferences 
that in turn influence decision-making and judgment (Payne, Bettman, and Schkade 1999; Slovic 
1995; Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006; Johnson, Steffel, and Goldstein 2005).  Hence, given that some 
cognitive process is employed in people’s choices, it would hardly be a surprise if mood states are 
able to affect human decision making and behavior. In fact, in two studies that used simple games, 
mood states have been found to influence labor interactions (Kirchsteiger et al., 2006) as well as 
generosity and reciprocity (Capra, 2004). In this study, our goal is to examine how mood states can 
affect people’s behavior in a conventional laboratory experiment (see Harrison and List 2004). 
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Specifically, we explore how positive and negative mood states affect the rate of preference 
reversals and bidding behavior in homegrown value auctions. This issue is important since if mood 
states can indeed significantly influence behavior in laboratory economic experiments such as ours, 
then this can have significant implications for experimental designs and the need to control for mood 
states when conducting laboratory auction experiments. To our knowledge, our study is only the 
third paper in economics that assessed the effect of moods in a complex environment such as 
auctions. The other two studies are by Lerner et al.  (2004) which found negative mood state in the 
form of sadness (disgust) to increase (decrease) willingness to pay (WTP) and by Capra et al. 
(Capra, Meer, and Lanier 2006) which found only weak mood effects on WTP. Our paper differs 
from these two studies in that we focus not only the effect of mood states on WTP but also on 
people’s rationality as represented by rate of preference reversal.  
The preference reversal phenomenon is an empirical regularity that has been first noticed by 
psychologist (Slovic and Lichtenstein 1968). While economists such as Grether and Plott (1979) first 
set out to disprove the psychologists’ work on the preference reversal phenomenon, they ended up 
attesting to its robustness. Since then many studies have tried to explain the causes of preference 
reversals and these are nicely summarized in Seidl’s review (Seidl 2002). Despite the numerous 
studies, the issue was not of course settled. Economists found new patterns of preference reversals 
that were incompatible with the best-known explanations (Cubitt, Munro, and Starmer 2004) or even 
presented new theories, such as the third generation prospect theory, that could predict observed 
patterns of the preference reversal phenomenon (Schmidt, Starmer, and Sugden 2008). Harrison et 
al. (2007) argued that preference reversals often happen because the cost of an error is really small 
when people are risk averse. However, at its very basic design (e.g., Cox and Grether 1996), the rate 
of preference reversals can be seen as a test of preference theory. Our basic question is therefore 
whether certain mood states can alleviate the rate of preference reversal or make it worse. To 
generate preference reversals in our experiments, we asked our subjects, among others, to price 
lotteries in an auction setting. Since lotteries are homegrown value goods, our design also allows us 
to examine the effect of induced mood states on bidding behavior. 
This paper proceeds as follows: the next section presents a literature review of published 
studies that deal with mood in the economic literature. The purpose of the review is to set the context 
of our study and place it in the existing literature. Section 3 describes the experimental design set 
forth and section 4 describes the analysis and the results. We conclude in the final section and 
discuss future research directions. 
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Literature review 
A systematic review in EconLit of published articles that include mood in the title of the 
paper, identified less than fifty papers. These include papers published in journals of broader 
economic areas that often move along the boundaries of psychology and economics as well as in the 
fields of marketing, business and finance. These articles have been scattered around many, often 
diverse, journals. The big core of mood related articles (more than half of the papers) have been 
published in marketing type journals like the The Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of 
Marketing Research or Psychology & Marketing, spanning a period from 1985 to 2010. On average, 
about one paper is published per year in the marketing field.  
In this section we will primarily focus on studies that are related to consumers’ decision 
making processes and only briefly mention studies related to other topics. For example, there is a 
small literature developed in the field of finance that examines the relationship between equity 
pricing and mood (e.g., Dowling and Lucey 2008a; Saunders 1993). However, these and other 
studies (e.g., Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi 2000; Dowling and Lucey 2008b; Kliger and Levy 2003) 
do not deal with individual decision making but rather try to relate exogenous phenomena like 
weather and lunar phases (that are assumed to affect collective or social moods) with investors’ 
behavior.  
On the other hand, the marketing strand, which contains the majority of the mood related 
literature, spends considerable effort in inducing individuals into certain mood states and then 
studying the effect of inducement on certain market like phenomena. A good, although dated, 
literature review which focuses on consumers’ mood related behavior is by Gardner (1985). Gardner 
examined the effect of induced moods on a range of behaviors, affective reactions, judgments and 
ability to recall information. A considerable amount of this review reported on findings from the 
psychology literature, indicating that mood has direct and indirect effects on behavior, product 
evaluation and recall. 
Since Gardner’s literature review, the marketing literature has been very active publishing 
empirical studies that examine the effect of induced mood states on a variety of phenomena. A 
widely cited finding is that happy mood induces people to provide higher product evaluations, an 
effect which persists even days after the original evaluation (Pocheptsova and Novemsky 2010). For 
example, in Lawson (1985), happy mood-induced subjects gave higher product desirability ratings 
than subjects in sad mood. Perhaps this is due to the fact that positive mood biases negative 
thoughts, which in another study led to more favorable evaluation of advertising messages (Batra 
and Stayman 1990). Indeed, Lawson (1985) found that people in negative mood tend to recall more 
negative information while Batra and Stayman (1990) found that positive mood leads to more 
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heuristic processing of information i.e., affect the amount of total cognitive elaboration, bias the 
evaluation of argument quality, and peripherally affect brand attitudes.  
In addition, Swinyard (1993) found that only involved subjects (i.e., in a shopping 
experience) in a positive mood evaluated a shopping experience more favorably while there was no 
difference for uninvolved consumers. When people think that the evaluation they are doing is 
important, then they are more likely to rate a product favorably but not when it is not perceived as 
important (Curren and Harich 1994). A similar effect on product ratings was observed in 
Raghunathan and Irwin (2001) but the effect of mood on product ratings was greater under domain 
mismatch (i.e., whether products in the context set belong to the same category as the target) than 
under domain match. Qiu and Yeung (2008) reconfirmed that subjects in a happy mood rate products 
more favorably than subjects in an unhappy mood. They also showed that mood influences 
comparative judgments. Specifically, they found that participants in a happy mood tend to choose 
the first shown option (from a list of three bakery products). However, when information about the 
flavor of the products was released right after all products were shown, subjects tend to choose the 
last shown option and evaluated this option much higher. Similar effects to product evaluations have 
been documented with service quality ratings (see for example Sirakaya, Petrick, and Choi 2004; 
White 2006; Barger and Grandey 2006; Knowles, Grove, and Burroughs 1993; de Ruyter and 
Bloemer 1998; Pugh 2001). 
A small strand of the marketing literature has also reported on how mood relates with brand 
extensions, brand evaluations/selections and brand recalls. Barone et al. (2000) found that positive 
mood not only affects evaluations of the product under examination but also of the product’s brand 
extensions since it makes brand extensions to be perceived similarly to core brands. Consumers are 
also more likely to learn more brand names, recall brands from more categories, recall more brands 
per category and exhibit more clustering of brands from the same category under a positive mood 
(Lee and Sternthal 1999). This effect of positive mood on brand recall was demonstrated even when 
mood was induced 72 hours later than when ads were displayed (Knowles, Grove, and Burroughs 
1993). Moods have also been found to affect brand choice since positive mood prompts experiential 
selection strategies (i.e., concentrating on feelings and fantasies about using particular brands) 
whereas negative mood prompts informational strategies (i.e., using acquired or stored brand 
information) (Gardner and Hill 1988). In addition, subjects in positive mood are more reluctant to 
switch brands and lose confidence in their preferred brand when disconfirming information (i.e., 
information challenging subjects tentative preferences) are given, which can be interpreted as a sign 
of less preference reversals (Meloy 2000). 
In addition to mood effects on product and brand evaluations, moods have also been shown 
to affect the very core of the decision making process. For example, in Spies et al. (1997) subjects in 
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a positive mood were found to be more satisfied with their shopping experience and to spend more 
money on spontaneous purchases. Positive mood has also been demonstrated to affect decision 
making by facilitating resistance to temptation (as defined by choices between two snack items; 
M&Ms and grapes) (Fedorikhin and Patrick 2010). The decision making process for subjects in a 
positive mood may also be related to higher needs in Maslow’s hierarchy, involvement of more 
sensory and experiential thoughts (Gardner and Hill 1989) and more variety seeking (but not in 
extreme positive mood) (Roehm and Roehm 2005). Mood has also been shown to affect risk taking 
behavior. Park et al. (2005) found that positive mood negatively influenced perceived risk from 
online purchases which in turn positively influenced purchase intention. Similarly, Grable and 
Roszkowski (2008) found that positive mood was associated with having a higher level of financial 
risk tolerance, as measured by a series of hypothetical questions. 
Two more studies found significant differences on how subjects’ decision making is affected 
by mood in the judgmental and risk domain. Englich and Soder (2009) asked subjects to take upon 
the role of a judge and decide how to punish a person in a shoplifting scenario. The scenario was 
anchored with either a low or high sentence from the prosecutor. The expert sub-sample anchored 
their decision independent of the mood state they were into, while the non-expert sub-sample under a 
positive induced mood remained uninfluenced by the given anchor. Results remained uninfluenced 
even when the authors changed the judgmental domain to be less affective in nature. In another 
study, de Vries et al. (2008) tested how mood affects subjects that play the Iowa Gambling task. In 
this game, subjects were given two decks of cards to choose from. Profits were determined based on 
draws from the decks. Subjects had to learn through repetition that only one of the decks increases 
their profits. The authors found that subjects in a positive mood relied more on their gut-feelings in 
decision making (better performance in the early stages of the game when subjects are still highly 
uncertain) while those under a negative mood adopted a more careful, analytical decision strategy. 
In contrast to the more established and expansive literature from other fields of social 
science, the literature on mood effects in economics is more limited and recent. Examples of these 
recent economic papers include Capra (2004) who studied the effect of induced mood states in a 
standard trio of games that are often used in experimental economics i.e., the dictator, ultimatum and 
trust games. She found that positive mood in the dictator game induces helping behavior i.e., 
proposers contributed more to the receiver. In the ultimatum and trust games, choices of those with 
positive mood were closer to rational choices and farther from the benchmark than those with 
negative mood.  Her findings were generally confirmed by Kirchsteiger et al. (2006). They found 
that subjects playing a gift-exchange game were more generous to others although they had much 
lower reciprocal behavior. More recently, Capra et al. (2010) studied the effect of induced mood on 
induced and homegrown value nth price auctions. They found that positive mood made the auction 
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less demand revealing in nature i.e., subjects overbid more relative to their induced value. However, 
their results generally suggest that mood only had a weak effect on homegrown value elicitation. 
Although published in a marketing journal, Meloy et al. (2006) is closely related to economic 
science since they took a shot at how experimental economists embraced financial incentives as 
essential to the validity of their research. The authors randomly assigned subjects to (financial) 
incentive and no-incentive treatments and found that financial incentives altered subjects’ mood but 
this resulted in decreased task performance since elevated mood negatively influenced information 
processing in decision making. 
In summary, we have demonstrated that much of the literature on mood effects has been published in 
non-economic social science literature.  Our objective in this study is to add to the scant economic 
literature on mood effects by focusing on the effect of induced moods on the observed anomalies in 
preference theory and in homegrown value auction experiments. Our study is different from Capra et 
al. (2010) in that: (1) we focus on subjects’ rationality or rate of preference reversals and (2) we 
explore gender differences in mood effects on both WTP and rate of preference reversal.  While 
there are differences in experimental designs, we can also use our study to test the robustness of their 
findings. Conducting the experiments with homegrown auction experiments is also important since 
the number of these experiments conducted by economists has grown significantly in the last 10 
years partly due to increasing interest in experimental auction methodologies and valuation research.  
 
The experiment 
To explore the effect of mood on human decision making we designed an experiment with a 
three-fold purpose. Our first objective was to explore the rate of preference reversals in the market 
for lotteries. Lotteries are homegrown value goods, but assuming rationality, individuals’ rankings of 
two lotteries should be the same whether they are participating in a choice task or submitting 
separate bids for the two lotteries in an experimental auction. A comparison of the frequency of 
preference reversals across treatments where we induce different mood states would allow us to 
determine whether positive or negative mood leads to increased/decreased rationality. Our second 
objective is to explore the effect of induced mood states on bidding behavior in homegrown value 
auctions, which will enable us to examine the robustness of the results obtained in Capra et al. 
(2010).  In their study, they obtained only weak mood effects on subjects’ WTP. 
Since the tasks that our subjects undertake involve choices under risk in what might look like 
a competitive environment and given the widespread evidence on how males and females behave 
differently under those conditions (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; Gneezy, Leonard, and List 
2009; 2009b, 2009a), our third objective was to isolate any gender effects that might come up in 
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mixed sessions and explore how subjects behave when only peers of the same gender participate in 
the lab. Therefore, we run additional sessions with males only and females only. 
To minimize the number of sessions that we would need to run for the full design, we 
decided to induce different mood states to subjects in the same session. Given that our computer lab 
is equipped with private booths and no communication was aloud, we were certain that no mood 
contagion would take place. Our mood inducement technique is described in detail below. 
The mood experiment was part of a larger project on choice under risk, therefore it also 
involved some risk preference and time preference tasks. The time preference task was placed at the 
very end of each session since it involved winning a considerable amount of money and we did not 
want to risk contaminating the previous tasks with income effects. The risk preference task and the 
preference reversal task (which include the auction) were presented in alternating order between 
sessions to avoid order effects. 
Our design involved six treatments in six sessions1. In the first two treatments we induced 
half of the subjects with positive mood and half of the subjects with negative mood. The only 
difference between the first two treatments was that the order of the preference reversals and risk 
preferences task were alternated. In treatments 3 and 4, our control treatments, mood was only 
measured and not induced. The order of the preference reversals and the risk preferences task was 
also alternated in these treatments. Treatments 5 and 6 were similar to treatment 1 except that 
subjects in these treatments were all females and males, respectively. Table 1 shows the 
experimental design. We only used one proctor or monitor (i.e., one of the authors) for all sessions. 
 
Description of the experiment 
A conventional lab experiment was conducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007).2 
Subjects consisted of undergraduate students at the Agricultural University of Athens. During the 
recruitment, the nature of the experiment and the expected earnings were not mentioned. However, 
subjects were told that they will be given the chance to make more money during the experiment. 
Stochastic fees have been shown to be able to generate samples that are less risk averse than would 
otherwise have been observed (Harrison, Lau, and Rutström 2009). 
                                                 
1 In our very first session one of the subjects could not keep himself quiet during the experiment. Given the sensitivity of 
our design to contaminating mood behavior, we reran this session with a completely different set of subjects. Therefore, 
in total we ran seven sessions, the seventh being a re-run of treatment one. We dismissed data from session 1 from all 
further analysis since we considered these data contaminated. 
2 z-Tree is a software package designed to facilitate computer-based economic experiments. It has been used in 
numerous experiments as evident by the more than 1800 citations that the paper documenting the software has collected 
in Google scholar. 
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The experimental design we adopted is exhibited in Table 1. Each subject participated in only 
one treatment. The size of the groups varied from 15 to 18 subjects per treatment. Each treatment 
lasted a little more than an hour. In total, 101 subjects participated in our experiments, which were 
conducted in March 2010. 
Each session consisted of different phases: the training phase, the mood induction phase, the 
mood measurement phase, the preference reversal phase (split into the choice and the lottery auction 
tasks), and the post-auction phase3. Subjects were given clear prior instructions on the overall layout 
of the session and were also reminded about the procedures at the beginning of each phase.  
 
The training phase 
A second-price Vickrey auction (1961) was used to elicit subjects’ values for lotteries4. After 
arriving at the lab, subjects were randomly assigned to a computer. Subjects were given €15 as a 
participation fee at the end of the experiment. We emphasized that although they were not given the 
money at the beginning of the experiment, the €15 was theirs to use as they please and that they 
should think that they have this money already. To control for possible monetary endowment effects, 
subjects were also told that a random amount of money between €0.5 and €4 was going to be 
assigned to each one of them.5 Everyone then received a random draw determining their individual-
specific extra fee, which was added to their participation fee as soon as the computerized phase of 
                                                 
3 We also included risk and time preference phases after the preference reversal phase but since these phases are not part 
of this paper’s research focus, we are not giving a detailed discussion of these phases.  In  brief, we followed similar 
procedures reported in (Andersen et al. 2008)  
4 Admittedly, the choice of the valuation mechanism plays a crucial role in the accurate elicitation of homegrown values. 
For example, there is always a chance of disengaging some of the participants in auctions due to small number of 
winners. Shogren et al. (2001) found that the 2nd price auction worked better for on-margin bidders while the random nth 
price auction worked better for off-margin bidders. Rutström  (1998) found that English auction bids are significantly 
lower than Vickrey auction bids, on average, and that there is a significantly smaller residual variance in English bids. 
Harrison (2006) and Harrison et al. (2004) emphasize the importance of having simultaneous bid submission rather than 
having real-time bid submission or real-time sequential bid submission such as in an English auction. Lusk and Rousu 
(2006) have found that on average the 2nd price auction and the nth price auction are more accurate than the BDM and 
Shogren, Cho et al. (2001) found that the WTP/WTA gap remains in a BDM mechanism while it disappears in active 
market environments like the 2nd and nth price auctions.  Considering the different advantages and disadvantages and the 
different findings about the accuracy of valuation estimates of the various mechanisms, our choice (2nd price auction) 
was largely influenced by the popularity of the mechanism in the valuation literature. Our interest as well is on the 
“relative effect” of induced mood states on subjects’ valuation so choice of auction mechanism should be less of a 
concern than when the objective is to examine the effect of moods on the effectiveness of a mechanism. 
5 In every step that involved random drawings by the computer, we reassured subjects that the drawing was fair and that 
extra care was taken by the programmer to make sure that this is the case. 
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the experiment began. We emphasized to the subjects that the endowment they received was private 
information and that they should not communicate this information to other subjects in the lab. All 
transactions were completed at the end of the experiment.  
Subjects were given extensive training to fully familiarize them with the auction mechanism 
and to inform them that it is in their best interest to bid their true values (i.e., their dominant 
strategy). They were asked to watch a short PowerPoint presentation to familiarize them with the 
auction procedures. The presentation included a short explanation of the second-price auction, along 
with a numerical example demonstrating why it is in their best interest to bid truthfully. Subjects 
then took a short computerized quiz to determine if they thoroughly understood the experimental 
procedures. After the quiz, the monitor explained the correct answers and subjects were encouraged 
to ask questions about the auction procedures and their dominant strategy. Since we employed 
homegrown auction experiments, we wanted to make sure that all subjects were fully informed of 
the auction procedures and educated about their dominant strategy or the need to reveal their true 
WTP values. The type of extensive training we used in this study has been found to be effective in 
making subjects bid truthfully in Vickrey auctions (Drichoutis, Nayga, and Lazaridis 2010).  
Next, subjects bid in three practice hypothetical multi-product auction rounds.6 The monitor 
emphasized that while these rounds were simply intended to further familiarize subjects with the 
auction procedure, they should bid as if they were in a real auction. The monitor also emphasized 
that one binding round and product would be randomly chosen at the end of these rounds. A screen 
displayed subjects’ hypothetical payoffs after these rounds. 
After getting the subjects fully familiarized with the auction mechanism and procedures, 
subjects then bid in three real multi-product auction rounds.7 The monitor emphasized that these 
rounds were now real and that the highest bidder would actually pay for the products. Again, one 
round and one product were randomly chosen as binding at the end of these rounds. A screen 
displayed subjects’ earnings after these rounds. To avoid the possibility of bids getting influenced by 
affiliated beliefs about the value of the products, we did not provide subjects information about 
observed bids or prices from the previous round. Instead, we only provided them with the ID of the 
winner from the previous round. Affiliated beliefs could arise when subjects anchor their bids to 
previously observed bids. Hence, between rounds the only available information given was subject’s 
winning ID. The IDs were randomly distributed by the computer so no-one but the winner could 
identify the highest bidder. 
  
                                                 
6 The products were a packet of gums, a bag of cookies and a bag of potato chips. 
7 The products we used were a Tobleron chocolate, a pack of Soft Kings cookies and Kraft’s Lacta chocolate. 
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The mood induction phase 
Mood induction procedures have been widely used by psychologists. Capra et al. (2010) gave 
a brief summary of the different methods used in the psychology literature. In this study we used 
experience of success/failure as our mood induction procedure, similar to what was used in many 
other studies (Barone, Miniard, and Romeo 2000; Swinyard 1993, 2003; Capra 2004; Capra, Lanier, 
and Meer 2010; Hill and Ward 1989; Curtis 2006). This method has been used and favored by 
psychologists because it involves direct experience of mood. Specifically, subjects in the mood 
induction treatments were given a MENSA test that has to be completed within 6 minutes. Half of 
the subjects received a 16-question hard MENSA test and half of the subjects received an easy 
MENSA test (the tests are available at http://sites.google.com/site/moodauctions/).   
The questions were first pretested in an online survey with a convenience sample using 
snowballing methods. Subjects were randomly exposed to one of the two versions. After taking the 
MENSA test, we then measured subjects’ moods (see next subsection). In the online hard version, 
the pretest subjects answered on average 4.5 questions correctly while in the online easy version, the 
pretest subjects answered 12.9 questions. Their scores were displayed right after the time to 
complete the test expired, along with a phrase stating that the average person between 18-55 years 
old answers about 10 questions correctly, that 95% of the people answer at least 6 questions 
correctly and that only 5% answer more than 12 questions correctly. Given subjects’ scores in the 
two versions, this feedback immediately placed the average subject in the hard version to the low 
5% of the population while the average subject in the easy version was placed at the top 5%. This 
way subjects in the hard version experienced failure and subjects in the easy version experienced 
success. In a sample of 49 subjects in the online pretest, the two versions of the test were adequate in 
inducing different levels of positive affect (the null of equal scores on the positive affect scale was 
highly rejected on a t-test with a p-value of 0.02). 
While the procedure we discussed above is not new, has been validated, and has been used in 
several other studies (e.g., (Swinyard 1993; Barone, Miniard, and Romeo 2000; Swinyard 2003), we 
wish to discuss the inducement method further since provision of false feedback on subject’s 
performance can be considered a form of deception. On a more pragmatic basis, this would be a 
problem if subjects were participating repeatedly  in experiments since they would then develop a 
general expectation of deception (Hertwig and Ortmann 2001). However, all our subjects were naive 
subjects i.e., they have never participated before in an economic experiment or a survey organized 
by this university. In addition, it is necessary to involve some deception when inducing moods since 
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the use of a carefully designed theatrical display is needed (Baron 2001)8. Deception, however, 
makes it more difficult for future experimenters to induce subjects into believing in their stories. We 
are however not too concerned about this issue given that our lab policy is for subjects to participate 
in an economic experiment only once. In informal individual debriefings, we also asked our subjects 
what they thought about the various phases of the experiment and none of them mentioned the mood 
induction phase. Also, none of the authors was a professor of any of the subjects, which otherwise 
may have prevented students from stating their true state of mind regarding the procedures followed 
in the session. In our experiments, we informed all our subjects that the purpose of the test was to 
test their cognitive skills. Since we did not want subjects to associate different phases of the 
experiment and put the picture together, they were also told that the experiment they are 
participating in consists of sub-experiments that are not necessarily related to each other. Subjects 
that answered the hard version of the test scored significantly lower in the positive affect scale 
(discussed in the next paragraph). There was no significant difference between subjects with respect 
to the negative affect scale. 
 
The mood measurement phase 
To find ways to measure mood, we turned to the psychology literature for guidance. Watson 
and Vaidya  (2003) provided a comprehensive overview of the dimensionality of the mood construct 
as well as on ways to measure its dimensions. Mood is usually depicted as a circular scheme with 
four bipolar dimensions that are spaced 45 degrees apart. The positive affect and negative affect 
dimensions are considered the most important measures of the higher order dimension.  
The PANAS scale (Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule; which was later subsumed into 
the PANAS-X)  (Watson 1988) emerged as the standard measure of these constructs and has been 
widely used in the literature (Pocheptsova and Novemsky 2010; Bono and Ilies 2006; Pelled and Xin 
1999; de Ruyter and Bloemer 1998; Pugh 2001). The terms comprising the PANAS-X Positive 
Affect scale are active, alert, attentive, determined, enthusiastic, excited, inspired, interested, proud, 
and strong; the items included in the Negative Affect scale are afraid, ashamed, distressed, guilty, 
hostile, irritable, jittery, nervous, scared, and upset. Subjects rated the extent to which they 
experienced each term right after inducement on a 5-point scale (1 = very slightly or not at all, 5 = 
                                                 
8 Another method for inducing moods is the use of film clips.  However, an important limitation of the use of films is 
that there are no widely accepted sets of mood eliciting film stimuli, not to mention the challenge of finding film stimuli 
for culturally different or non-English speaking subjects. Also, use of film clips is still a form of deception since subjects 
are not told that films clips are shown to induce their moods. Subjects are instead told that they will be evaluating the 
films. 
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extremely). In the lab the order of appearance of these terms was completely randomized. The scale 
has been thoroughly tested for reliability and validity (see Watson and Vaidya 2003). 
 
The preference reversal phase  
This phase typically includes two tasks; a choice task and an auction task. In the choice task 
subjects indicated their preference for each of the two pairs of lotteries with the understanding that 
one pair would be randomly selected as binding. Table 2 presents the bet pairs with their 
probabilities and expected payoffs. The ordering of bet pairs was randomized across subjects to 
avoid order effects. 
Bet pairs were adopted from Cox and Grether (1996).  Each bet pair included a “P-bet” and a 
“$-bet”.  A P-bet lottery involves a bet with a high probability of winning a modest amount and a 
low probability of losing an even more modest amount. A $-bet involves a bet with a modest 
probability of winning a large amount and a high probability of winning a modest amount. Typical 
preference reversal studies find that a significant fraction of subjects give prices that are opposite to 
the choices made out of the respective lotteries (see Seidl 2002 for a review of the literature). For bet 
pair 1, the bad outcome for the $-bet is worse than that for the P-bet and the opposite is true for bet 
pair 2. 
In the auction task, subjects bid on the same four lotteries shown in Table 2, indicating how 
much, if anything, they were willing to pay to buy each lottery. Lottery order was again randomized 
across subjects. Subjects repeated the bidding task for five consecutive rounds with the 
understanding that only one lottery and one round would be randomly chosen as binding. Between 
the rounds, subjects observed only the winner’s ID (2nd highest price was not posted).  
 
The post-auction phase 
Subjects provided information about their age, household size and income. Experimental instructions 
are available at http://sites.google.com/site/moodauctions/. 
 
Econometric analysis 
Was the mood induction successful? 
 Figure 1 displays kernel density estimates of the affect scores for positive and negative affect 
respectively. The vertical lines depict mean estimates of the scores per treatment. 
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 Remember that a hard MENSA test aims to induce a negative mood to subjects and an easy 
MENSA test aims to induce a positive mood state through experience of failure and success, 
respectively. We are certain that subjects did experience success or failure given that those exposed 
to an easy MENSA test in the lab answered on average 12.9 questions correctly (out of 16) while 
those exposed to a hard MENSA test answered about 6 questions correctly.  
 It is obvious from panel A that the density function of positive affect for those exposed to the 
hard MENSA test is slightly shifted to the left implying lower scores for those exposed to the hard 
test. The density function of those exposed to the easy test has a slightly larger peak but is otherwise 
very close to the density function of the control group. One could tell a similar story based on the 
means (vertical lines) of the positive affect scores across treatments. 
 Panel B shows that both densities associated with the negative affect scores of those exposed 
to the easy and hard test are shifted right with respect to the control group. The density function of 
those exposed to the hard test is slightly more to the right but is practically indistinguishable from 
the density function of those exposed to an easy test. Comparing the means just reconfirms the 
above. 
These results hold up in a regression context. We run separate regressions for the positive affect and 
negative affect scales which are depicted in Table 4. The list of covariates includes dummies for 
those exposed to the easy and hard MENSA tests (the Control treatments, where mood was not 
induced, serve as the base category). We used demographic variables as additional control variables. 
Variable description is exhibited in Table 3. 
 Results are in agreement with Figure 1. Subjects that were exposed to a hard test scored 
significantly lower in the positive affect scale compared to subjects in a control group and those who 
took the easy test by almost 4 points. No statistically significant differences are observed between 
those answering an easy test and those in the control group and in fact the difference is negligible. In 
all, it seems that our mood induction procedure was able to induce lower levels of positive affect to 
those that took the hard test. 
 On the other hand, both the easy and hard tests induced higher negative affect with respect to 
the control group by as much as 5 points which is also evident in Figure 1 where both density 
functions are shifted to the right. The Hard coefficient is larger than the Easy coefficient by one 
point (i.e., those exposed to a hard test had on average higher levels of negative affect) although their 
difference is not statistically significant. So why did both procedures induce higher negative affect? 
One explanation could be that the quiz-type procedure resembles exams that associate negatively 
with students’ mood e.g., test anxiety. It is also important to remember that positive affect and 
negative affect are two dimensions of mood that can co-exist. The overall conclusion is that subjects 
that took the hard test had lower positive affect than subjects that took the easy test and there was no 
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statistically significant difference in their negative affect level. They also exhibited less positive 
affect and higher negative affect than the control group.  
 Subjects that took the easy test had no statistically significant difference on positive affect 
with the control group and they exhibited higher negative affect than the control group. They also 
exhibited similar negative affect levels with those subjects that took the hard test. Our mood 
inducement procedures can therefore be considered successful when we compare results between the 
mood induction treatments. 
 
Mood and subjects rationality 
 Assuming rationality, individuals’ choices over two lotteries should rank lotteries the same 
way they are implicitly ranked when submitting bids to buy the lotteries in an experimental auction. 
Otherwise the subject commits a preference reversal. In Figure 2 the mean and median rates of a 
preference reversal is depicted when pooled across lotteries. Subjects that were induced into positive 
mood exhibit a smaller rate of committing a preference reversal both on average and on the median 
level. Preference reversals rates of the control group and those in the negative mood are almost 
identical at the median level and only marginally lower on average for the negative mood group 
(Figure 2, panel A) up to round 3. 
 
 The notion that both induced mood states reduce the rate of preference reversals is supported 
in the conditional analysis as well. To account for the panel nature of our data, we estimated a 
random parameters probit model, where the probability of observing a preference reversal is 
specified as: 
  0 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 11 2
12 3 13 4 14 5 15 2 16 3 17 4
Prob 1
i i i i i i
t i i
b b Positive b Negative b t b Order b FemalesTreat
y F b MalesTreat b TotFee b Age b Gender b HSize b Educ
b Educ b Educ b Educ b Income b Income b Income
                     
 (1) 
where t is a time trend variable, Positive (Negative) is a dummy indicating whether subjects where 
induced into positive (negative) mood, Order is a dummy indicating the order of the preference 
reversal and risk preferences tasks, FemTreat and MalTreat are dummies indicating sessions that 
only females and only males participated, respectively (i.e., not mixed), TotFee is the total fee 
endowed to each subject (recall a portion of this fee was randomly determined) and F is the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function. The rest of the variables are described in Table 3. 
 The beta parameters in the random parameters probit model are formulated as i i b b Σw , 
where b  is the fixed means of the distributions for the random parameters, Σ  is a nonnegative 
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definite diagonal matrix of standard deviations and iw  is unobservable random term. For nonrandom 
parameters, some of the diagonal elements of Σ  can be zero. Simulated Maximum Likelihood 
estimation (SML) can be used to estimate the model. The simulated log likelihood is maximized 
with respect to the elements of ib  and Σ . We allowed the treatment variables to be formulated as 
random and set the diagonal elements of Σ  at zero for the rest of the variables. 
Coefficient estimates of a probit model are not directly interpretable, so we estimated the marginal 
changes exhibited in Table 5. Limdep v9 was used in all estimation steps.9 
Both bet pairs produce similar results in terms of the direction of the effect. Some differences are 
observed in terms of the magnitude of the coefficients. We find that both positive and negative mood 
decrease the probability of a preference reversal with respect to a control group by as much as 
24.5%. Positive mood has a larger effect than negative mood as evident in both bet pairs. For 
example, in the high expected payoff bet pair those induced into a positive mood were 20.6% less 
likely to commit a preference reversal (compared to the group where mood was not induced) while 
those in a negative mood where 5% less likely to commit preference reversals. The two figures are 
much closer when it comes to the low expected payoff bet pair. However, a test of the hypothesis 
that the Negative coefficient is equal to the Positive coefficient is highly rejected for both bet pairs.10  
The order of the tasks did not have any effect on preference reversals given that the respective 
coefficients are neither economically or statistically significant. We find significant gender effects 
when comparing sessions that were conducted with females (males) only and mixed sessions. 
Females, in the gender-specific sessions were 30.7% to 53% more likely to commit a preference 
reversal with respect to the mixed sessions, while males in the gender-specific sessions were 6.4% 
less likely to commit a preference reversal. However, the gender variable is positive which means 
that on average males were more likely to commit a preference reversal. Therefore, in terms of 
subjects’ rationality and given that rationality is a key assumption of economic theory, mixed 
sessions where less beneficial for males but more beneficial for females in the sense that female (but 
not male) subjects were more in line with preference theory. Various demographic effects are also 
evident in Table 5. 
 
                                                 
9 The random parameters models are favored in both cases (bet pairs) as compared to a random effects model based on 
the results from Likelihood Ratios tests (LRHigh=41.12, p-value=0.00, LRLow=25.56, p-value=0.00). 
10 To test for this hypothesis we imposed a linear restriction of the form bPositive=bNegative and conducted a LR test 
(LRHigh=10.31, p-value=0.00, LRLow=8.50, p-value=0.00). 
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Mood and bidding behavior 
The average and median bids pooled over lotteries are exhibited in Figure 3. Subjects under 
positive mood bid lower than those under negative mood and the control group, both at the mean and 
median level as evident in panels A and B. The difference grows across rounds and by round 5 the 
bids of the control group and those induced into positive mood differ by almost 0.60€ at the mean 
level and 0.55€ at the median level. Those under negative mood bid marginally lower than the 
control group and the differences are practically indistinguishable at the median level. Bids tend to 
increase across rounds. 
Table 6 shows results from estimating random parameters tobit models. We used tobit 
models to account for the censoring of the dependent variable. The specification is similar to the one 
we used for the probit models.  
LR tests are in favor of the random coefficient model vis-à-vis the random effects models.11 
Results are qualitatively the same across lotteries although there are some notable differences. This 
is the reason why we also estimated a pooled model. The last column exhibits results from 
estimating a tobit model pooled across lotteries. Instead of using lottery dummies we used variables 
indicating probability of winning a positive amount of money (ProbWin), maximum amount of win 
(MaxWin) and maximum amount of loss (MaxLoss). 
With respect to the treatment variables, positive mood has a negative statistically significant 
effect across lotteries. Subjects under positive mood were bidding €0.43 to €0.64 less than the 
control group (€0.61 for the pooled model). Subjects under negative mood bid lower than the control 
group for the low expected payoff lotteries (C and D) and bid more for one of the high expected 
payoff lotteries (B). Bids from these subjects exhibit no statistically significant difference with 
respect to lottery A. The pooled model shows that subjects under negative mood bid €0.25 less that 
the control group. We tested for equality of the Positive and Negative coefficients and the null was 
rejected in all cases.12 The results for lotteries C, D and the pooled model are similar to Capra et al. 
(2010). A major difference however, it that we find stronger effects than they reported.  
The time trend variable (rounds) is positive and statistically significant indicating that 
subjects increase bids across rounds by as much as 0.16€ per round (lottery D). Females that were 
bidding on the gender-specific session bid higher over all lotteries (as compared to the mixed 
sessions) while males that participated in the gender-specific session bid higher for 3 out of 4 
lotteries, and lower for one lottery. Bids were significantly higher in the gender-specific sessions 
                                                 
11 LRLotA=62.9 (p-value=0.00), LRLotB=88.3 (p-value=0.00), LRLotC=40.9 (p-value=0.00), LRLotD=149.6 (p-value=0.00), 
LRPooled=76.52 (p-value=0.00) 
12 LRA=7.77 (p-value=0.00), LRB=4.95 (p-value=0.02), LRC=5.73 (p-value=0.02), LRD=15.00 (p-value=0.00), 
LRPooled=48.92 (p-value=0.00) 
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than the mixed session as indicated by the magnitude of the coefficients. In all, it appears that bids in 
mixed gender sessions tend to be lower than bids in gender-specific sessions. Total money 
endowment (TotFee) has a significant effect as well, although the direction of the effect differs 
across lotteries. However, the magnitude of the effect is not substantial in every case. For lottery B 
the coefficient indicates that for every € endowed to the subject s/he will bid almost 18% of it in the 
auction while for lottery A only 5% of it. For other lotteries the effect is close to zero. It looks like 
the effect of money endowment cancels out in the pooled model and is close to zero. 
Several demographics effects are also evident in Table 6. For example males bid more than 
females for one of the high expected payoff lotteries (for lottery A by as much as €0.22) but bid less 
for the low expected payoff lotteries (for C and D lotteries by as much as €0.51). 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Compared to other social sciences (e.g., the marketing literature) which have long recognized 
the importance of mood states on individual decision making, the economics profession has been 
relatively slower in accommodating psychological insights related to mood states. As Rabin (2002) 
puts it in his discussion about behavioral economics, “prominent skeptics have predicted that interest 
in the area will peter out as researchers realize that this latest craze offers little value”. It is perhaps 
this skepticism over what may turn out to be a fad that makes many economists reluctant to bringing 
psychological insights into economics. However, the growing area of behavioral economics is 
testament to the increasing influence of psychological concepts in economic studies. 
As far as we know, our paper is just the third paper in the field of economics that addresses 
the effect of positive and negative moods on decision making processes in laboratory auction 
settings. While we addressed the effect of mood states on bidding behavior (i.e., WTP) similar to the 
other two studies (i.e., Capra, Lanier, and Meer 2010; Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein 2004), we 
also focused on an issue that has not been examined: the effect of mood states on subject’s 
rationality as represented by rate of preference reversal. Interestingly, we find that both positive and 
negative mood states induce subjects to being more “rational” (i.e., being less likely to commit a 
preference reversal) as compared to a control group (i.e., neutral mood) by as much as 24.5%.   
Admittedly, this finding is puzzling since it suggests that it would be better to have subjects with 
positive or negative moods than neutral moods at all. However, our results also suggest that positive 
mood has a larger negative effect on the probability of preference reversals; that is subjects exhibit 
more rational behavior under a positive mood state than under a negative mood state. So why does 
positive mood generate more rational behavior than negative mood and neutral mood? It is possible 
that negative or neutral mood makes people become less engaged on the task or it affected their 
 19
performance. In fact, Miner and Glomb (2010) found that positive mood is associated with improved 
task performance and Jordan and Lawrence (2006) related negative mood to negative performance. 
In contrast to our finding, however, Capra et al. (2010) found that positive mood generates biases in 
decision-making while negative mood provides biases not different from neutral mood.  The reason 
for the difference in the results is not clear. However, they tested the impact of mood on the 
effectiveness of the auction mechanism while we analyzed moods on the rate of preference reversal.   
We also explored how subjects bid on a homegrown value good (i.e., lotteries) under 
different mood states. This is in essence a reinvestigation of Capra et al. (2010) which used different 
homegrown value goods (lotteries vs. movie tickets) and different elicitation mechanisms (2nd price 
auction vs. random nth price auction). We generally find stronger mood effects than they did. 
Specifically, subjects in a positive mood state bid lower values than others (subjects bid lower as 
much as 0.65€ for one of the lotteries) while negative mood has different effects, depending on the 
expected value of the lottery. It is possible that positive mood inhibits competitiveness while 
negative mood enhances competitiveness.  Our results are stronger than Capra et al.’s (2010) finding 
of weak mood effects, and consistent with what psychologists have generally found – that negative 
mood provides higher valuations than positive mood. 
The two results of our study on preference reversals and bidding behavior should however 
not be viewed in isolation. For example, positive mood states have a strong negative effect on lottery 
valuation. The magnitude of the effect is however different across lotteries. It is then possible that 
mood states affect the relative valuation of the lotteries, consisting of the bet pair, which in turn 
affects the rate of preference reversals. It is not necessary that mood states changes preferences per 
se. Perhaps mood states put a cost on overpricing certain lotteries similar to what happens in 
situations with market-like arbitrage (Gunnarsson, Shogren, and Cherry 2003). 
It is worth noting that Lerner et al. (2004) when they induced subjects in what they call “sad” 
state (similar to our negative mood state) observed a reverse endowment effect; that is choice prices 
(somewhat different to buying prices) are higher than selling prices. In addition, choice prices were 
higher than the control treatment and selling prices were lower than the control treatment. The 
positive effect on valuations is in contrast to both our study and Capra et al. (2010). One could also 
claim that perhaps mood states altered risk preferences which in turn may have made some lotteries 
more or less attractive. However, consistent with Walser and Eckel (2010), we found using some 
additional data we collected (Drichoutis and Nayga, 2010) that mood does not affect risk 
preferences. Capra et al. (2010) found similar effects (albeit weaker) on homegrown value auctions 
using movie tickets (and not lotteries).  Hence, we claim that changes in bids could not have been 
due to changes in risk aversion.  
 20
Another interesting finding we discovered from this study is that regardless of mood states, 
males tend to commit a higher rate of preference reversal than females in mixed gender sessions.  
However, females tend to commit higher rate of preference reversal in female only sessions than in 
mixed sessions while males tend to commit a lower rate of preference reversal when in male only 
sessions than in mixed sessions.   
As evident in our discussion above, there are many aspects of mood behavior that still needs to 
be analyzed with regards to their effects on economic decision making. This topic could indeed be a 
prime area for future behavioral economics research. It remains to be seen though if this line of 
research will influence economics on a long-term basis. Having said this, we think that economists 
may be able to utilize this line of research when addressing standard economic questions using 
standard economic methods that are not based solely on a particular set of assumption that are often 
not supported by behavioral evidence (Rabin 2002). 
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Table 1. Experimental design 
Treatments Mood inducement Subject pool Order of Tasks 
1 Yes, Positive-Negative Mixed Preference Reversals – Risk Preferences 
2 Yes, Positive-Negative Mixed Risk Preferences – Preference Reversals 
3 No Mixed Preference Reversals – Risk Preferences 
4 No Mixed Risk Preferences – Preference Reversals 
5 Yes, Positive-Negative Females Preference Reversals – Risk Preferences 
6 Yes, Positive-Negative Males Preference Reversals – Risk Preferences 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Lotteries used in the experiment 
Lottery Bet type Bet pair 
Probability of 
win 
Amount of 
win 
Probability of 
loss 
Amount of 
loss 
Expected 
payoff 
A P-bet 
1 
90% 4 10% 1 3.50 
B $-bet 28% 16 72% 1.5 3.40 
C P-bet 
2 
75% 2 25% 1 1.25 
D $-bet 18% 9 82% 0.5 1.21 
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Table 3. Variable description 
Variable Variable description Mean SD 
Age Subject's Age 20.614 1.673
Gender Dummy, 1=male 0.416 0.495
Hsize Household size 4.307 0.997
Educ1* Dummy, 1st year student 0.198 0.400
Educ2 Dummy, 2nd year student 0.129 0.337
Educ3 Dummy, 3rd year student 0.366 0.484
Educ4 Dummy, 4th year student 0.168 0.376
Educ5 Dummy, 5th year student 0.139 0.347
Income1* 
Dummy, Ηousehold's economic position is good, very 
good or above average 0.059 0.238
Income2 Dummy, Ηousehold's economic position is average 0.515 0.502
Income3 Dummy, Ηousehold's economic position is below average 0.208 0.408
Income4 Dummy, Ηousehold's economic position is bad or very bad 0.218 0.415
Positive 
(Hard) 
Dummy, Subject is induced into positive mood (exposed to 
hard MENSA test) 0.337 0.475
Negative 
(Easy) 
Dummy, Subject is induced into negative mood (exposed 
to easy MENSA test) 0.356 0.481
Control* Dummy, Subject's mood is not induced 0.307 0.464
T Time trend (Round) 3.000 1.415
Order Dummy, Preference reversal task is conducted first 0.663 0.475
FemTreat Dummy, only females in the session 0.178 0.385
MalTreat Dummy, only males in the session 0.168 0.376
Mixed* Dummy, mixed gender sessions 0.653 0.478
TotFee Total money endowment 17.208 1.219
* Removed from estimations. 
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Table 4. Regression results for positive and negative affect 
Positive affect Negative affect 
Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error
Constant 43.577** 17.847 45.698*** 13.765 
Easy 0.549 1.711 3.917*** 1.319 
Hard -3.776** 1.703 5.013*** 1.313 
Age -0.078 0.944 -1.796** 0.728 
Gender 0.566 1.394 2.277** 1.075 
Hsize -0.187 0.671 -0.325 0.518 
Educ2 -1.287 2.485 0.908 1.916 
Educ3 -3.092 2.756 3.779* 2.126 
Educ4 -2.239 3.858 5.124* 2.976 
Educ5 -1.917 4.926 7.057* 3.799 
Income2 -4.826 2.990 1.320 2.306 
Income3 -5.018 3.187 3.394 2.458 
Income4 -0.334 3.164 0.387 2.440 
R-squared 0.187 0.254 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.076 0.153 
Note: ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.   
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Table 5. Marginal effects and discrete changes (Probit models) 
    
High expected payoff 
bet pair 
  
Low expected payoff 
bet pair 
  
Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error
N
on
-r
an
do
m
 
Age 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.035 
Gender 0.075* 0.041 0.338*** 0.074 
Hsize -0.015*** 0.005 -0.067** 0.027 
Educ2 -0.017** 0.007 -0.083 0.060 
Educ3 0.095 0.069 0.045 0.105 
Educ4 0.012 0.041 -0.159** 0.066 
Educ5 0.501 0.355 0.039 0.220 
Income2 0.057 0.051 -0.677*** 0.079 
Income3 0.106 0.131 -0.258*** 0.037 
Income4 0.382 0.242 -0.287*** 0.039 
R
an
do
m
 
Positive -0.206*** 0.050 -0.245*** 0.047 
Negative -0.050*** 0.017 -0.228*** 0.050 
T 0.004 0.004 -0.030** 0.014 
Order -0.042 0.027 -0.005 0.057 
FemTreat 0.307** 0.143 0.529*** 0.117 
MalTreat -0.064*** 0.018 -0.040 0.079 
TotFee 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.018 
Note: ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.   
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Table 6. Marginal effects and discrete changes (Tobit models) 
    
Lottery A 
  
Lottery B 
  
Lottery C 
  
Lottery D 
  
Pooled over 
lotteries 
 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error Coef. 
Std. 
Error Coef. 
Std. 
Error Coef. 
Std. 
Error Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
N
o
n
-
r
a
n
d
o
m
 
Age 0.031 0.033 -0.080** 0.039 -0.108*** 0.024 0.107*** 0.033 0.014 0.019 
Gender 0.226*** 0.062 0.089 0.067 -0.206*** 0.042 -0.511*** 0.060 -0.019 0.036 
HSize -0.026 0.024 0.263*** 0.026 -0.086*** 0.016 0.010 0.022 0.060*** 0.014 
Educ2 -0.006 0.090 -0.081 0.097 -0.069 0.063 -0.206** 0.085 -0.041 0.053 
Educ3 -0.123 0.101 0.722*** 0.115 0.247*** 0.074 -0.459*** 0.098 -0.121** 0.060 
Educ4 -0.039 0.147 0.890*** 0.165 0.066 0.104 -0.544*** 0.130 -0.065 0.087 
Educ5 -0.449*** 0.173 0.278 0.208 0.580*** 0.131 -1.015*** 0.097 -0.147 0.105 
Income2 0.326*** 0.114 -0.793*** 0.106 -0.259*** 0.084 -0.373*** 0.096 -0.346*** 0.060 
Income3 0.857*** 0.123 -0.287** 0.115 0.198** 0.091 -0.100 0.105 0.077 0.063 
Income4 0.426*** 0.120 -0.447*** 0.107 -0.204** 0.084 -0.689*** 0.091 -0.233*** 0.063 
ProbWin -  - -  - -  - -  - 3.560*** 0.204 
MaxWin -  - -  - -  - -  - 0.213*** 0.013 
MaxLoss -  - -  - -  - -  - -1.595*** 0.108 
R
a
n
d
o
m
 Positive -0.430*** 0.068 -0.518*** 0.073 -0.647*** 0.037 -0.541*** 0.064 -0.614*** 0.050 
Negative -0.100 0.067 0.257*** 0.072 -0.274*** 0.044 -0.199*** 0.065 -0.250*** 0.040 
t 0.137*** 0.015 0.136*** 0.017 0.051*** 0.011 0.156*** 0.014 0.113*** 0.010 
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Order -0.374*** 0.058 0.459*** 0.062 -0.163*** 0.040 0.478*** 0.054 0.156*** 0.034 
FemTreat 0.164** 0.082 0.279*** 0.090 0.496*** 0.060 0.292*** 0.077 0.328*** 0.050 
MalTreat 0.413*** 0.092 -0.717*** 0.090 0.277*** 0.066 0.537*** 0.094 -0.013 0.055 
TotFee -0.047** 0.020 0.178*** 0.022 -0.018 0.014 0.117*** 0.019 -0.009 0.012 
Note: ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.   
33 
 
Figure 1. Kernel density estimates for affect scores 
 
 
Figure 2. Average and median rates of a preference reversal pooled over bet pairs 
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Figure 3. Average and median bids pooled over lotteries 
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